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Abstract This article considers the role of activism and politics to 
restrict the supply of fossil fuels as a key means to prevent further 
climate injustices. We firstly explore the historical production 
of climate injustice through extractive economies of colonial 
control, the accumulation of climate debts, and ongoing 
patterns of uneven exchange. We develop an account which 
highlights the relationship between the production, exchange, 
and consumption of fossil fuels and historical and contemporary 
inequalities around race, class, and gender which need to be 
addressed if a meaningful account of climate justice is to take 
root. We then explore the role of resistance to the expansion 
of fossil-fuel frontiers and campaigns to leave fossil fuels in the 
ground with which we are involved. We reflect on their potential 
role in enabling the power shifts necessary to rebalance energy 
economies and disrupt incumbent actors as a prerequisite to the 
achievement of climate justice.
Keywords fossil fuels, climate justice, power shift, supply-side, 
colonialism, climate debt, unequal exchange, resistance, race, 
class, gender.
1 Introduction
Runaway climate change constitutes an unprecedented threat 
to the prospects of development of the world’s poor. This threat 
comes in the form of impacts on food and water security, ‘natural’ 
disasters, extreme weather events, and a wide range of health 
and environmental stresses associated with a ‘hothouse earth’ 
(Steffen et al. 2018). Though some of the worst effects of these 
changes will be felt in the future, many are already exacerbating 
and further entrenching existing inequalities and deprivations 
along the lines of race, class, gender, and other social dynamics.
At the same time, the project of globalising, modernising 
development driven by extractivism and uneven exchange – and 
financed by the development industry itself – is one of the key 
drivers of that change and shows few signs of changing course 
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despite growing acknowledgement of the threat the climate 
crisis poses to efforts to eliminate poverty articulated in the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Newell forthcoming). 
Without a sustained effort to disentangle itself from fossil-fuelled 
development, the development industry is unlikely to play a 
progressive and transformative role in building a climate-resilient 
future. This is a critical moment for it to withdraw support for the 
fossil-fuel economy and the infrastructures which sustain it.
We now need a new approach to addressing this crisis. As 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
pointed out, we need ‘transformative systemic change’ (IPCC 
2018: 40). This is no longer a question of incremental change or 
narrower forms of ‘plug and play’ whereby new energy sources 
or technologies are added to the mix, but all other relations of 
power and systems of production and exchange remain in place 
(Newell and Martin 2020). Critical to the success of any such 
efforts is the need for power shifts to rebalance energy economies 
as a prerequisite to achieving climate justice (Newell 2021b). This 
means consciously and deliberately rolling back the power of the 
fossil-fuel industry over politics.
The power of that lobby is evident in the incongruence between 
the commitments nations have signed up to under the Paris 
Agreement and ongoing plans to expand production of fossil 
fuels. The latest Production Gap report by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Stockholm Environment 
Institute (SEI), for example, showed that governments are planning 
to extract 120 per cent more fossil fuels than is compatible 
with the goals of the Paris Agreement (SEI et al. 2020). For 
this reason, we seek to address the elephant in the room: the 
under-acknowledged yet critical need to equitably leave vast 
swathes of remaining fossil fuels in the ground.
2 The production of climate injustice
We suggest here that a more historical, social, and global 
account of the production of climate justice is needed so as to 
identify possible intervention points for countering and reversing 
patterns of climate injustice with a particular focus on supply-side 
climate policy in contrast to the dominant policy approach to 
date of regulating demand-side consumption-based emissions. 
The history of climate change is one of compounding injustices. 
The wealth of many Western countries was built on the riches and 
natural resources extracted from their colonial empires, a process 
that motivated – and in turn was fuelled by – the burning of coal, 
oil, and gas and vast deforestation. The Industrial Revolution may 
have produced crowded, smoke-filled cities full of people with 
chronic health problems, but over time, it ensured that future 
generations in industrialised economies would grow up in relative 
privilege compared with people elsewhere, who were often living 
under colonial rule. The consumption of fossil fuels forms a key 
pillar, therefore, of global inequality.
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2.1 Historicising climate injustice in the fossil-fuel economy
First, regarding the historical production of climate injustice, 
richer countries not only emit more carbon into the atmosphere 
per capita than poor countries do, but also their very wealth 
and stature rest on a century of emissions and environmental 
degradation (Malm 2016). A growing number of accounts have 
shown how the wealth from colonial looting financed growing 
concentrations of fossil-fuelled wealth in colonial powers 
(Newell 2021a; Nikiforuk 2012). Work on carbon debts, meanwhile, 
demonstrates the extent of the over-use of the commons by 
richer states and the disproportionate responsibility they bear 
to now address the impacts of the pollution generated by the 
wealth they have extracted (Adow 2020; Simms 2005).
While some aspects of the violence that was intrinsic to 
colonialism are less visible or flagrantly exercised today, the 
danger is that technologies of control furnished in the colonial 
era, such as direct extraction and dispossession of land 
and livelihoods, are now getting replayed through climate 
colonialism in the form of green grabs and reducing emissions 
from deforestation and degradation (REDD) forest projects, for 
example (Bachram 2004; Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 2012).
Amid this more general account, there is also a need to be more 
specific about agency and the disproportionate responsibility 
of the ‘polluter elite’ and the fossil-fuel majors in particular 
(Kenner 2019). For example, just six of the largest listed oil and 
gas companies alone hold reserves that together would use up 
more than a quarter of the remaining 2°C budget and historically 
speaking, just 90 companies have caused two-thirds of 
anthropogenic global warming emissions (Heede 2014). Likewise, 
only about 5 per cent of the world’s population collected around 
50 per cent of fossil-fuel rents generated between 1970 and 2010 
(Kartha, Lazarus and Tempest 2016).
Second, this historical account needs to include a recognition 
of the racial nature of extractivism. Scholarship on racial 
capitalism usefully draws attention to the implied racialised 
hierarchy that characterises the operation of the global economy 
(Bhattacharyya 2018; Tilley and Shilliam 2018) where standards of 
protection, duty of care, and enforcement of rights are practised 
in uneven ways which leave racialised minorities particularly 
vulnerable to social and environmental injustices (Bullard 2000). 
This is true of those on the frontlines of more extreme extractivism, 
as well as through displacement and dispossession, and the 
dumping of the waste and externalities produced by the 
accumulation of wealth in richer parts of the world (Agyeman, 
Bullard and Evans 2003). These racialised hierarchies are also 
visible in the double standards adopted by richer colonial powers 
that reject polluting fossil-fuel infrastructures at home but 
provide financial support for fossil-fuel infrastructures in formerly 
colonised economies, such as UK government support for gas 
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terminals in Mozambique or fracking in Argentina, having banned 
fracking at home.
When rich nations do invest in poor countries, they end up 
spending billions of dollars propping up fossil-fuel industries 
there. A 2018 report by the research and advocacy organisation 
Oil Change International showed that between 2014 and 2016, 
‘60 per cent of international public aid for energy projects in 
Africa was spent on fossil fuels – principally through investments 
in oil and gas infrastructure – with only 18 per cent directed to 
renewable sources such as wind and solar energy’ (OCI 2018: 67).
At the 2020 UK–Africa summit on ties between the UK and African 
countries, the UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, announced that 
his country would stop using aid money to fund coal projects 
abroad, and an official government press release for the event 
highlighted increased funding for clean energy. But a few days 
later, it emerged that 90 per cent of the energy deals concluded 
at the summit were in fact for fossil fuels.
The issue of double standards applies equally to the private 
sector. Research by Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund 
found that the amount of carbon dioxide production financed 
by Britain’s banks and asset managers is nearly double the UK’s 
annual carbon emissions (Makortoff 2021). Meanwhile, a report 
on fossil finance by Rainforest Action Network, the Indigenous 
Environment Network and others found two major UK banks to 
be in the top 13 largest financers of fossil fuels worldwide, with 
Barclays Bank alone responsible for US$145bn of funding over the 
period 2016–20 (RAN et al. 2021).
Contemporary expressions of deep-seated colonial attitudes 
which underpin these double standards are not hard to find. At 
a Pacific Islands Forum in 2019, the chair of that gathering, the 
former prime minister of Tuvalu, Enele Sopoaga, said he was 
stunned by Australian prime minister Morrison’s remark that Pacific 
leaders should ‘take the money… then shut up about climate 
change’ (Lyons 2019). The degrading insult was made worse by 
the words of Morrison’s deputy, Michael McCormack, who at the 
time said he was ‘annoyed’ at the Pacific Islanders ‘pointing the 
finger at Australia’ over the climate crisis when in actual fact the 
islanders would survive ‘because many of their workers come here 
to pick our fruit’ (ibid.).
Meanwhile, the UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, stated in a 
magazine article that: ‘the best fate for Africa would be if the 
old colonial powers, or their citizens, scrambled once again in 
her direction; on the understanding that this time they will not be 
asked to feel guilty’, reflecting his diagnosis that ‘The problem is 
not that we were once in charge, but that we are not in charge 
anymore’ (Johnson 2016).
 IDS Bulletin Online First ‘Reframing Climate and Environmental Justice’ 
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
2.2 Global inequities
These historical inequities continue to be reflected in vast 
disparities in emissions and contributions to the production of 
climate injustice. The contrasts are stark: the United States, with 
a population of approximately 323 million, emits 5bn metric 
tonnes of carbon dioxide per year compared to a region such as 
sub-Saharan Africa which emits a combined total of around 823m 
metric tonnes of carbon dioxide per year from a population of 
about a billion people (Adow 2020). The figures indicate contrasts 
that are as huge as twentyfold (ibid.). In the Commonwealth, 
richer countries such as the UK, Canada, and Australia have high 
per capita emissions than many other Commonwealth countries 
in the global South. For instance, a Power Shift Africa (2020: 9) 
report indicated that ‘the UK emits more carbon dioxide per 
person than 18 Commonwealth countries combined’. In the same 
report, it was found that Canada and Australia emit more carbon 
dioxide than 27 Commonwealth nations and 28 Commonwealth 
countries respectively (ibid.).
Moreover, ongoing global ambitions on the part of the richest 
countries to expand their fossil-fuel industries imply greater 
reductions in carbon budgets for poorer countries if overall limits 
are not to be surpassed. Power Shift Africa (2020) found that 
richer countries such as Canada, despite their low population, 
have plans to use up a large part of the remaining global carbon 
budget. This is notwithstanding the rhetoric from the leadership 
of these countries. For example, in spite of the promises and 
commitments from Canadian leadership, if its investment plans 
are anything to go by, it might end up using a third of the world’s 
remaining carbon budget (ibid.). Trudeau’s commitment to a 
fossil-fuel future was made clear when he said to a group of 
cheering Texas oilmen: ‘No country would find 173 billion barrels of 
oil in the ground and leave them there’ (ibid.: 9). There is a chasm, 
therefore, between the emissions of the wealthy global North 
members and Commonwealth countries from the global South 
that are the most affected by the impacts of climate change.
Furthermore, the post-Covid-19 pandemic economic recovery 
plans of governments such as the UK, Australia, and Canada 
are pumping billions of dollars into dirty fossil-fuel industries, 
effectively rebooting some of the richest economies on the backs 
of Commonwealth citizens in climate-vulnerable countries. G20 
governments have directed more Covid-19 recovery support to 
fossil-fuel production and consumption than to renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, and other low-carbon alternatives (US$233bn vs 
US$146bn, as of November 2020) (SEI et al. 2020: 20), while a report 
by Tearfund in June 2021 showed that G7 nations have spent 
US$190bn on coal, oil, and gas compared to just US$147bn on 
clean energy since the start of the pandemic (Dufour et al. 2021).
Underpinning this disparity is extractivism and ecologically 
uneven exchange. This takes a number of forms: from virtual 
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carbon (the outsourcing of the most polluting parts of the 
production process) to the dangers of renewable extractivism 
and the intensification of mining. For example, minerals such 
as lithium and cobalt are mined to support transitions to 
electrification of the energy system in wealthier parts of the world 
(Sovacool et al. 2019).
Richer countries are also able to make use of a range of spatial 
and temporal fixes (Harvey 1981) through green grabs, carbon 
trading, and the like to displace responsibility for the climate 
crises onto poorer groups, particularly in the global South 
(Newell 2021b). Though some of these interactions are privately 
driven, many are reinforced by global institutions of trade, aid, 
and finance, and the use of state power. They produce lock-in 
through a particular model of dependency, export of fossil fuels, 
and private-led power sector reform (Tellam 2000; Newell 2021b). 
This ideology and set of institutional lock-ins perpetuated by the 
development industry needs to change if we are to address the 
roots of climate injustice.
2.3 The production of social injustices in the fossil-fuel economy
As well as a historical account of the injustices associated with 
today’s fossil-fuel economy which necessarily form the starting 
point for campaigns for climate and environmental justice, we 
also need a more social account. Climate change exacerbates 
existing inequalities. Between 1961 and 2000, emissions from 
poorer countries caused US$740bn worth of damage to wealthier 
countries, whereas emissions from richer countries caused 
US$2.3tn worth of damage to poorer ones.
In poorer countries, the impacts of climate change have 
extended beyond economic damage. In these regions, climate 
change is hindering socioeconomic progress and people’s 
wellbeing. In sub-Saharan Africa, frequent extreme weather 
events are affecting people’s livelihoods, thus impeding economic 
growth. It is noteworthy that despite sub-Saharan Africa having 
contributed the least to the global energy-related emissions, it 
is having to pay the highest economic price for emissions from 
richer countries. Sub-Saharan African countries such as Burkina 
Faso, Niger, and Sudan have had a significant reduction in their 
per capita gross domestic products as a result of climate impacts 
(Meseret 2020; Diffenbaugh and Burke 2019; Adow 2020).
Social relations of race, class, and gender interact with these 
economic and environmental injustices, exacerbating existing 
vulnerabilities, exclusions (from resources and their governance) 
and inequalities (Newell 2005, 2021a). A large number of studies 
on environmental justice, environmental racism, and from 
feminist political ecology explore these dynamics (Bullard 2000; 
Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter and Wangari 1996; Sikor and Newell 
2014). These cover not just direct sites of extraction of fossil fuels, 
but also their processing in petro-chemical complexes in places 
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such as ‘Cancer Alley’ in Louisiana in the US, for example (Wright 
2005). The breadth of social, human, and environmental impacts 
produced along the fossil-fuel supply chain, from hazardous 
working conditions and local pollution at the source of production, 
to marine pollution in the transport of fossil fuels around the 
world, to the health impacts of their combustion in housing 
and transport systems, creates, at the same time, incentives 
for intersectional alliances. These can be between movements 
as diverse as labour, indigenous groups, women’s groups, and 
environmental movements with different reasons for fighting a 
common battle against the largest driver of climate injustice.
3 Contesting climate injustice
Climate injustices will continue to be perpetuated as long as the 
fossil-fuel economy lasts. An urgent priority for social movements, 
non-governmental organisations, and governments, therefore, is 
to disassemble that economy in as fair a way as possible as part 
of a just transition. There are a number of ways of doing this.
First, there are campaigns to withdraw financial support to fossil 
fuels. This means challenging the lending practices of bodies 
such as the World Bank, as well as bilaterals and governments 
through advocacy on fossil-fuel finance. The issue is that despite 
the negotiation of the Paris Agreement in 2015, total multilateral 
development bank finance for oil and gas exploration more than 
doubled from 2015 to 2016, from US$1.05bn to US$2.15bn. The World 
Bank Group, the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the Asian 
Development Bank were the largest financiers of fossil fuels in 2016. 
At the same time, renewable energy still made up less than a third 
of multilateral development bank energy finance (OCI 2018).
There have been a number of successes in this regard, including 
commitments from the EIB to discontinue financial support to 
fossil fuels and from the UK government to end the use of export 
finance for fossil fuels, though much work remains to be done and 
such commitments often come with caveats and exemptions 
and need to be situated in the broader landscape of financial 
flows described below. Some campaigns have exposed the 
inconsistencies in government policy between climate objectives 
and the ongoing pursuit of fossil-fuel extraction, such as the 
campaign aimed at the activities of specific government 
agencies in the case of the ‘paid to pollute’ campaign targeted 
at the UK’s oil and gas authority which has a mandate to expand 
fossil-fuel extraction. This included a judicial review launched by 
the campaign group Uplift exposing the fact that since signing 
the Paris Agreement in 2016, the UK government has paid £3.2bn 
of public money to North Sea oil and gas companies.1
With regard to the private sector, fossil-fuel divestment 
movements have played a critical role in encouraging institutional 
investors – universities, pension funds, and others – to divest 
from fossil fuels (Bergman 2018). Thanks largely to the climate 
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advocacy group 350.org joining forces with the student activists, 
to date, 688 institutions and 58,399 individuals across 76 countries 
have committed to divest from fossil-fuel companies. By 2018, the 
fossil-fuel divestment movement marked the 1,000th divestment 
in what has become by far the largest anti-corporate campaign 
of its kind, bringing the total size of portfolios and endowments in 
the campaign to just under US$8tn (£6.4tn) (McKibben 2018).
Second, there is more politically focused work to disrupt 
incumbent control over the political system. This aims to 
challenge the political influence of the polluter elite (and not just 
their investment power or direct emissions associated with high 
carbon living) (Kenner 2019) through exposure work and lobbying 
for greater regulation and transparency around lobbying, 
representation, party donations, and the like. It focuses on 
cleaning up governance with regard to party donations, revolving 
doors, internships, and access to key decision-making bodies 
(Newell and Martin 2020).
The work of activist organisations such as the Corporate 
European Observatory and DeSmog is particularly important 
here. To give an indication of the scale of the challenge, by the 
close of 2019, 134 members in US Congress and their spouses 
owned as much as US$92.7m worth of stock in fossil-fuel 
companies and mutual funds (Kotch 2020). Fossil-fuel industry 
political giving outdoes renewables 13 to 1 in the US, with the 
fossil-fuel industry spending at least US$359m in the 2018 
mid-term cycle for federal campaign donations and lobbying 
(Kirk 2020). Globally, according to one recent analysis, among 
350 companies that represent around 100 leading industry 
groups, over 90 per cent have at least one membership in an 
industry association with lobbying practices that undermine the 
Paris Agreement (InfluenceMap 2021).
There is also a revolving door between high-level offices in 
government and fossil-fuel industries that needs to be stopped if 
the injustices associated with the expansion of fossil-fuel frontiers 
are to be brought to an end. For example, as Newell and Martin 
show, ‘nearly 90 per cent of people leaving the UK’s Department 
of Energy and Climate Change took up jobs in the energy sector, 
including six former energy ministers’ (Newell and Martin 2020: 
24). Some hold these positions at the same time. While serving as 
Minister of State for Energy, Charles Hendry secured £3,333 a day 
as a consultant for Vitol, the world’s biggest oil trader handling 
270m tonnes of oil in 2016.
However, the door swings the other way too, with private 
sector actors securing key roles in government. For example, 
Lord Browne, former CEO of BP, was made ‘lead non-executive 
director’ at the Cabinet Office by former prime minister David 
Cameron in 2010. Lord Browne was also chair of fracking 
company Cuadrilla at the time and made clear his intention to do 
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‘whatever it takes’ to promote shale gas (Cato 2018). Strategies 
need to focus on clearer party financing rules, registries of 
politicians’ interests, boards of companies they sit on, the 
corresponding restrictions on which committees they sit on, and 
policymaking processes they are part of when there are such 
obvious conflicts of interest.
Third, in recent years, litigation has emerged against individual 
fossil-fuel projects (e.g. coal mines in Australia and the UK, and 
oil and gas pipelines in the US), against individual fossil-fuel 
companies (Shell in the Netherlands, Total in France, ExxonMobil in 
the US), and against carbon majors as a whole (in the Philippines). 
The recent case against Shell is perhaps one of the most telling 
examples: the Dutch court ordered Shell to achieve a specific 
emission reduction target along its entire supply chain, effectively 
suggesting that the company had to cut back production (van 
Asselt et al. 2021).
Loss and damage represent another important frontier in 
this battle (Toussaint 2021). Yet, despite the existence of the 
Warsaw mechanism on loss and damage, at the Madrid climate 
summit, the US, with Russia’s support, ruled out agreeing to and 
implementing a concrete plan to increase financing for loss and 
damage. Other rich countries, including Australia, Japan, and 
some member states of the EU, sheepishly followed suit, leaving 
vulnerable countries without the help promised to them in 2013. 
Nevertheless, moves to strengthen loss and damage provisions 
might provide further impetus towards leaving fossil fuels in the 
ground (ibid.).
Fourth, and more directly, we have seen over the last few years, 
a growing wave of supply-side policy activism supporting 
countries and cities to adopt a range of policies to leave fossil 
fuels in the ground, as well as more broadly around the idea of a 
Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty or other multilateral alternative 
to equitably leave remaining swathes of fossil fuels in the ground 
(Newell and Simms 2019; Burke and Fishel 2020). Gaulin and 
Le Billon (2020), drawing on a fossil-fuel-cuts database, found 
that 1,302 initiatives were implemented between 1988 and 
2017 in 106 countries across seven major types of supply-side 
approaches. SAFE Cities, for example, is a growing network of 
cities, counties, and other communities that Stand Against Fossil 
Fuel Expansion (55 so far) and a number of key cities including 
Vancouver, Barcelona, Sydney, and Los Angeles, as well as the 
Australian Capital Territory, have endorsed the idea of a Fossil 
Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty. These efforts help to socialise the 
idea of production limits on fossil fuels.
Finally, and critically, there is widespread resistance to new 
fossil-fuel projects (Temper et al. 2020; Carter and McKenzie 
2020). This is a rising, but not altogether new, phenomena with 
resistance to the expansion of fossil-fuel frontiers in the global 
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North and South going back decades, even if climate was not 
the primary driver (Princen, Manno and Martin 2015). Temper 
et al. (2020) find, nevertheless, that over a quarter of fossil-fuel 
projects encountering social resistance have been cancelled, 
suspended, or delayed. The example of the proposed coal 
plant on the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization World Heritage site of Lamu off the Kenyan coast is 
an example of a victory for climate justice. A group of dedicated 
local campaigners, Save Lamu and DeCOALonise, managed to 
fend off the financial interests of investors General Motors and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.
Despite this resistance, many fossil-fuel companies are keen to 
see fossil-fuel expansion across Africa, from Ghana to Kenya 
and Mozambique, despite the abundance of renewable energy 
(Bos and Gupta 2016; Phillips 2019; Newell and Phillips 2016) and 
the geopolitical risks associated with further lock-in to fossil-fuel 
pathways (Gupta and Chu 2018). The role of Chinese finance in 
supporting investments in fossil fuels is especially notable here 
(Power et al. 2016; Shen and Power 2017) and presents particular 
challenges for activists where normal channels of influence 
are harder to pursue with state development banks based in 
non-democratic societies (Gore 2017).
This activism does not exist in a vacuum, therefore, but rather 
seeks to magnify and accelerate emergent political and social 
tipping points. These include a confluence of the falling price 
of renewables and availability of battery storage technologies, 
bolder government commitments including the adoption of 
supply-side policies by first movers such as Costa Rica, Belize, 
New Zealand, Denmark, and France, as well as coalitions building 
on the Powering Past Coal Alliance (Jewell et al. 2019). Another 
tipping point is the diminishing licence to operate of fossil-fuel 
companies contested by social movements across a range 
of policy arenas and cultural spheres, combined with investor 
concerns about stranded assets.
It is also important to note that some of this resistance is 
being articulated around novel articulations of intersectional, 
multi-generational, multicultural indigenous-led movements 
seeking to contest climate injustices, the criminalisation of land 
protection, and expressing forms of anti-colonial solidarity 
(Spiegel 2021a, 2021b). What this activism highlights and 
seeks to contest are the ways in which indigenous people are 
particularly affected by the injustices of fossil fuels (Jonasson 2019; 
Gilio-Whitaker 2019). In these instances, fossil fuels happen to be 
the campaign focus, but the activism is aimed at contesting, 
dismantling, and decolonising the very power structures, 
hierarchies, and failures of recognition which permit and 
enable these injustices to take place in the first place, routinely 
distributing the greatest costs of fossil-fuel expansion to poorer 
classes and to people of colour (Bullard 2000; Newell 2005).
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4 Conclusions
We have briefly explored here the growing momentum around 
a diverse range of strategies aimed at keeping fossil fuels in the 
ground. We have argued that their adoption and wider uptake 
are crucial to reverse centuries of injustices produced by the 
fossil-fuel economy, of which climate injustices are just the latest 
manifestation.
The onus is clearly on rich countries to take a lead in addressing 
these climate injustices. For reasons of lack of resources, 
capacity, or policy autonomy, many countries in the global 
South are trapped by these fossil-fuelled dependencies, 
sedimented over centuries. For many poor countries awash with 
problems, including insufficient energy production, following the 
fossil-fuel-laden course that wealthy nations took is the path of 
least resistance and is particularly attractive for elites in those 
countries because of the opportunities for rent-seeking that 
fossil fuels enable. Yet there is an opportunity to chart a different 
course, but also work to do in order to ensure that old injustices 
are not perpetuated, or newer ones created.
There is no one theory of change which will underpin the success 
of movements against climate injustices. We need to mobilise 
all pressure points to challenge fossil-fuel incumbency. This 
brings different challenges in different settings and depends a 
great deal on degrees of democratic space, the nature of state 
power, and the degree of positive engagement by business 
and civil society actors. The risks for many environmental 
defenders of confronting the fossil-fuel industry are very high 
(Global Witness 2017).
Then again, so are the risks of allowing runaway climate change 
and enabling the fossil-fuel industries to further tighten their grip 
on economies by locking in fossil-fuel use for decades to come. 
A key challenge is confronting and reducing incumbent power 
over future energy pathways when the interests of the state and 
fossil capital are so closely aligned, given the revenues, tax, and 
employment associated with the sector in both its state-owned 
and private configurations. This means that states are often 
willing to use their monopoly on the use of force to crush protest 
and dissent targeted at the fossil-fuel complex (Brock et al. 2018).
This is a critical moment in the history of activism against climate 
injustice. As desperation mounts about the scale of the challenge 
and the speed of responses needed, social movements can 
spend all of their time fire-fighting proposals to achieve net-zero 
that often include regressive solutions for many of the world’s 
poorest people. But they also need to keep focused on the 
elephant in the room: the obvious need to turn off the tap of 
finance for fossil fuels and to equitably leave large swathes of 
fossil fuels in the ground as the greatest single thing that can be 
done to prevent further climate injustices.
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